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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Differences in composition of seemingly identical, branded food products (DC-SIP) occur when a good is marketed in 
one country as being identical (labelling, and appearance on packaging) to goods marketed in other countries, while 
that good has significantly different composition. The DC-SIP issue was brought to policymakers’ attention in 2017 by 
tests conducted in several Eastern EU Member States, which showed that some brand owners sell products across the 
EU Single Market, which are of different composition, despite having the same or similar packaging. The European 
Parliament and the European Council stressed the importance of tackling the issue of dual quality products, and 
requested that the European Commission investigate these practices, and find a solution at the European level.  
As a response to this request, the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC), in collaboration with experts 
from Member States’ competent authorities and stakeholders in the food chain, developed and applied a harmonised 
methodology in 2018/2019, with the objective of bringing further evidence on whether the composition of various 
branded food products differed across Member States. A large EU-wide testing campaign confirmed that of the food 
products which were evaluated, 9% were found to have differences in composition but had identical front packaging, 
and 22% had differences in composition and had similar front packaging (European Commission, 2019). Further 
initiatives regarding the relevant regulatory framework were taken by the European Commission to address DC-SIP. 
Moreover, in April 2018, the European Commission tabled a proposal for the amendment of the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive 2005/29/EC, aimed at introducing more specific rules on the DC-SIP issue. The European Parliament 
and the Council adopted these amendments on 27 November 2019 (European Commission, 2018, 2019b). 
Furthermore, at the request of the European Parliament, the JRC carried out an economic analysis of DC-SIP in 
collaboration with DG GROW, to develop a better understanding of the drivers, and of the impact of this phenomenon. 
This report summarises the main finding of this pilot project. The specific objectives of this project were to: 
1. Explain the rationale for brand owners to offer different versions of identically or similarly branded food products in 
different markets 
2. Analyse the impact of DC-SIP on consumers’ choices and welfare 
3. Identify the main determinants of the occurrence of DC-SIP across Member States 
The first objective focuses on the DC-SIP issue from the producer side. It attempts to explain the factors which 
motivate brand owners to market different versions of the same product in different Member States, as well as how 
they might react to different regulatory options. The second objective focuses on analysing the DC-SIP issue from the 
consumer side, and investigates its impact on consumers’ purchasing decisions and welfare. The third objective builds 
on the findings of the first two, and empirically estimates the economic determinants (both from a producer and a 
consumer perspective) of the incidence of DC-SIP across Member States.  
The report uses conceptual analyses based on the theoretical and empirical knowledge developed in economics and 
related literature, as well as empirical analyses, to approach the objectives mentioned above. The type of analysis, 
which products were analysed, and in which Member States it was applied, are summarised in Table 0. The main 
findings are described below. 
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Table 0. Summary of the methods used, the products, and markets analysed in the report 
 Objective 1  
(Producer side) 
Objective 2  
(Consumer side) 
Objective 3 
(Horizontal analyses) 
Aim 
Incentives of brand owners 
to use DC-SIP practices 
Impact of DC-SIP on 
consumers’ purchasing 
decisions and welfare 
Consumers’ preferences 
for different versions of 
seemingly identical 
branded food products 
Determinants of the 
occurrence of DC-SIP 
presence across Member 
States 
Method 
Application of theoretical 
and empirical knowledge 
developed in the fields of 
industrial organisation, 
international marketing, 
international business, and 
management 
 
Market equilibrium model 
(numerical simulations) 
Application of theoretical 
and empirical knowledge 
developed in the fields of 
demand theory, 
behavioural economics, 
marketing, and consumer 
psychology 
Behavioural experiments: 
(1) discrete choice 
experiment (DCE) (online 
experiment), and 
(2) sensory testing 
experiment (lab 
experiment) 
Econometric estimations 
 
Use of results from the JRC 
2018/2019 EU-wide testing 
campaign, in combination 
with demand factors and 
production-related factors, 
collected from different 
statistical sources (e.g., 
Eurostat, Eurobarometer, 
World Bank, Global Dietary 
Database) 
Type of 
analyses 
Conceptual Conceptual Empirical Empirical 
Product 
coverage 
No specific products No specific products 
Six branded food 
products: flavoured 
yogurt, pre-cooked pasta 
dish, chocolate cookies, 
orange soft drink, crisps, 
fish fingers 
127 branded food products 
Member State 
coverage 
No specific Member States 
No specific Member 
States 
Germany, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Spain, 
Romania, Sweden 
19 Member States 
 
Incentives of brand owners to use DC-SIP practices (Objective 1): 
● In theory, firms can find it optimal to offer products with different composition in different markets, due to spatial 
heterogeneity in demand factors, production factors, competition, and regulations and institutions. However, these 
factors might not necessarily lead to DC-SIP. Firms which offer more than one version of a product in any given 
market do not necessarily need to market them identically. However, if they do so, and there is a difference in 
composition, this can result in DC-SIP. 
● The DC-SIP practice is more likely to occur when national markets are separated (e.g., due to territorial supply 
constraints). In this case, the rationale of firms for using DC-SIP practices is expected to be a result of their 
optimal strategy to maximise profits. A firm will adapt (or not adapt) the composition of the product, and offer (or 
not offer) country-specific versions depending on market conditions (supply and demand), and on the ability of a 
firm to exploit differences, and the separation in national markets. The greater the difference in market conditions 
between Member States, the greater the gain that companies can make from DC-SIP, and therefore the likelihood 
increases that versions differ between the Member States. 
● DC-SIP could be a result of a mix of marketing strategies which international firms pursue to place products in 
different markets. These strategies could include adaption of products to local conditions (‘go international’), or 
standardisation of products across markets (‘go global’). Using the first strategy, firms will benefit by better 
adapting products to local preferences. The second strategy will generate benefits by making use of the global 
brand image when marketing a product. DC-SIP may emerge when firms engage in a hybrid strategy 
encompassing both adaptation and standardisation, as both have positive relationships with performance. This 
hybrid strategy might lead to DC-SIP because companies offer global brand images, while product compositions 
are tailored to local conditions. The DC-SIP practice is more likely to occur when heterogeneity of demand across 
Member States is high, potential for economies of scale from providing the same product version across Member 
States are limited, the costs of changing the composition of the product are low, and the elasticity of demand in 
one of the national markets is low. 
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● Results from numerical simulations using a stylised market equilibrium model suggest that the DC-SIP practice 
reduces social welfare, and may have unexpected redistribution effects across firms and across consumers. 
Among the different regulatory options available to prevent DC-SIP these simulations show the following: 
o Regulations ensuring that consumers have enough information to assess products properly (information disclosure) 
are the best policy option as they unambiguously increase social surplus, providing that the cost of information is 
not too high. 
o Mandatory regulations which impose the same product composition in all Member States (‘product-of-reference’, 
and ‘one-market, one-quality’ policies) may have unintended consequences, as they may lead to overprovision of 
quality, as perceived by consumers in countries with lower preference for quality, and under-provision in countries 
with higher preference for quality. 
o The mandatory ‘identical composition’ regulations could be socially beneficial only if the differences in consumers’ 
preferences between the two markets are sufficiently small, and if the information bias about DC-SIP is sufficiently 
large. 
Impact of DC-SIP on consumers (Objective 2): 
● Theory shows that the perceived quality and preferences determine how a consumer values a product. The 
formation of consumers’ perception of quality is a complex process, as consumers take into consideration 
different intrinsic (e.g., composition) and extrinsic signals (e.g., brand, geographical origin, and packaging). Often, 
the role of extrinsic quality signals predominates. When analysing DC-SIP under the assumptions of these theories 
we can draw the following conclusions: 
o DC-SIP might go unnoticed, or not be taken in consideration when making purchasing decisions, because consumers 
often use extrinsic signals to infer quality of products, rather than intrinsic signals (i.e., composition) 
o Consumers are likely to be affected by DC-SIP only when differences in composition are perceived as significant 
between different versions 
o Price differences between different versions may offset consumers’ valuation differences between the versions. For 
example, even if the composition is significantly different between versions, and the versions are valued differently 
by consumers, consumers may still prefer the perceived lower quality version if it is significantly cheaper than the 
perceived higher quality version. 
o Furthermore, the mere existence of DC-SIP may generate consumers’ response, as it may lead to consumers’ 
perceiving both deception and unfairness. 
As a result, the impact of DC-SIP on consumer choices could be nil, positive, or negative, and could vary across 
consumers and products, both across and within Member States. 
● JRC behavioural experiments tested consumers' preferences in six Member States for the actual versions of six 
branded food products, for which DC-SIP were detected in the JRC 2018/2019 EU-wide testing campaign. These 
behavioural experiments show that if consumers were not informed about which country each version of the 
product is “made for”, in the majority of cases they were indifferent between the different versions of the tested 
products. For the minority of cases, where some preference for one version became apparent, there were no 
evident geographical patterns for the difference in preferences for DC-SIP products. These results indicate that 
the DC-SIP practice does not impact consumer choices when they are not expressly informed about the 
differences.  
● On the other hand, when the existence of DC-SIP was made salient, by informing consumers that the product is 
“made for” a specific country, in the majority of cases, they preferred one of the versions. There was no clear 
preference for domestic or non-domestic versions in the online experiment, whereas there was more preference 
for domestic versions in the lab experiment. These results suggest that it is the provision of explicit information, 
regarding which country the product version is “made for”, which generates the preference for one of the versions, 
although there is no clear pattern of preference for either the domestic or non-domestic version. 
Determinants of the occurrence of DC-SIP between Member States (Objective 3): 
The econometric estimations—using data from the JRC 2018/2019 EU-wide testing campaign, in combination with 
economic determinants collected from different statistical sources (e.g., Eurostat, Eurobarometer, World Bank, Global 
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Dietary Database)—show that the presence of DC-SIP in the EU is driven by the following different demand and 
production-related factors:  
● The difference in income levels between two Member States has a statistically significant positive effect on the 
probability of the two Member States being offered different versions of seemingly identical branded food 
products.  
● Other factors—such as heterogeneous consumer preferences across Member States, distance, company size, price 
level, and product complexity—also contribute to a firm’s incentive to offer different versions of seemingly 
identical branded food products in different Member States.  
● Specific characteristics of different product categories and country-specific factors also impact the presence of 
DC-SIP between Member States. 
Conclusions: 
● In theory, three key factors may determine the occurrence of DC-SIP: (i) national markets’ separation, (ii) 
differences in market conditions (be it in supply, demand, or degree of competition), and (iii) differences in 
regulations or institutions across countries. In such a situation, firms’ profit maximisation behaviour is to offer 
products tailored to local conditions under global brands. 
● Numerical simulations using a stylised market equilibrium model suggest that a policy promoting information 
disclosure (i.e., letting consumers know that product versions are different across Member States) is the best 
option to tackle DC-SIP, while regulations which impose the same product composition across Member States 
appear to be inferior policy options, as they may have unintended market consequences. 
● From a theoretical perspective, the formation of consumers’ perceptions of DC-SIP is a complex process. 
Consumers take different information and signals into consideration to infer the quality of the food that they 
consume. As a result, the impact of DC-SIP on consumers’ purchasing choices and welfare could be nil, negligible, 
positive, negative, or heterogeneous across consumers. Moreover, if consumers relate the presence of DC-SIP to 
deception or unfairness, the mere presence of DC-SIP may affect consumer choices and welfare. 
● JRC behavioural experiments show that without any additional explicit information on the occurrence of DC-SIP 
beside the provision of differences in the lists of ingredients and nutritional facts, consumers do not notice the 
differences between product versions and the DC-SIP practice does not impact their choices. If the occurrence of 
DC-SIP is made salient, for example by using a “made for” claim, consumers show preference for one of the 
product versions. 
● The econometric estimations show that the occurrence of DC-SIP across Member States is driven by different 
demand and production-related factors. 
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1 CONTEXT 
Differences in composition of seemingly identical, branded food products (DC-SIP) occur when a good is marketed in 
one country as being identical (labelling, and appearance on packaging) to goods marketed in other countries, while 
that good has significantly different composition (European Commission 2019b). The DC-SIP issue—also known as 
dual quality products—was brought to attention in 2017, in particular by tests conducted in several Central and Easter 
European Member States, which showed that some brand owners sell products across the Single Market, which have 
different compositions but still have the same or similar packaging (Borzan, 2017; Council of the European Union, 
2017; Croatian Food Agency, 2017; European Commission, 2019; European Parliament, 2017; Jancarikova, 2017; 
MPSR, 2017; Néhib, 2017; SZPI, 2015). Interventions from the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2013, 
2017, 2018) and the European Council (Council of the European Union, 2016) stressed the importance of tackling the 
DC-SIP issue, and requested that the European Commission investigate these practices, and find a solution at the 
European level. Similarly, the Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker stressed, in his State of the Union speech in 
2017, the need to take action to address DC-SIP practices (European Commission, 2017b).  
As a result of these developments, the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC)—in close collaboration with 
experts from Member States, competent authorities, and stakeholders in the food supply chain—has developed a 
common methodology, with the objective to improve food product comparative testing and to obtain results that are 
comparable across Member States (European Commission, 2018b). Under the coordination of the JRC, this 
methodology was subsequently applied in an EU-wide testing campaign in 2018/2019, to bring further evidence on 
whether the composition of various branded food products differ across Member States. The results of this EU-wide 
testing campaign were published in June 2019. Overall, 19 Member States participated and 128 branded food 
products were included in this campaign. According to the results, 9% of the evaluated food products had differences 
in composition but identical front packaging, and 22% had different composition but similar front packaging (European 
Commission, 2019). 
Moreover, further initiatives regarding the relevant regulatory framework were undertaken by the European 
Commission, to address DC-SIP. In 2017, the European Commission issued a set of guidelines on the application of EU 
food, and consumer protection law, to the issue of DC-SIP (European Commission, 2017). The guidance explains how 
the relevant legal requirements—in particular the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC (UCPD)—should 
be applied by the national authorities when analysing potential DC-SIP issues. In April 2018, the European Commission 
tabled a proposal for a directive on the modernisation of EU consumer protection rules, within the framework of the 
‘New Deal for Consumers’ (European Commission, 2018). Among other issues, it also aimed at introducing more 
specific rules on the DC-SIP issue, through amendment of the UCPD. The European Parliament and the Council adopted 
the Amending Directive on 27 November 2019. The Amending Directive needs to be transposed into national law by 
the Member States by 28 November 2021 and it should be applied from 28 May 2022 (European Commission, 
2019b). The new provision in the UCPD provides that competent authorities need to assess, on a case-by-case basis 
whether DC-SIP practices are misleading, while taking into account the impact of the practice on consumers’ 
transactional (purchase) decisions. Furthermore, by request of the European Parliament, the JRC, in collaboration with 
DG GROW, carried out an economic analysis of DC-SIP, to develop a better understanding of both the drivers and the 
impact, which is explained in this report. 
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2 OBJECTIVES 
The specific objectives of this project are to: 
1. Explain the rationale for brand owners to offer different versions of identically or similarly branded food 
products in different markets; 
2. Analyse the impact of DC-SIP on consumers’ choices and welfare; 
3. Identify the main determinants of the occurrence of DC-SIP between Member States. 
The first objective focuses on the issue of DC-SIP from the producer side. It attempts to explain the factors which 
incentivise brand owners to market different version of the same product in different Member States, as well as what 
their potential reactions to different regulatory options would be. The second objective focuses on the analysis of the 
DC-SIP issue from the consumers’ perspective, and investigates its impact on consumers’ purchasing decisions and 
welfare. The third objective builds on the findings of the first two, and empirically estimates the economic 
determinants (both from a producer, and a consumer perspective) of the incidence of DC-SIP across Member States 
(Table 1). 
This report complements previous JRC studies on the common methodology, and application of the common 
methodology for the EU-wide testing of DC-SIP, which were published in 2018 and 2019, respectively (European 
Commission 2018b, 2019). The report complements the aforementioned studies as it provides an economic 
perspective on the phenomenon, particularly focusing on better understanding the motivation for such practices, 
determining whether the DC-SIP practice influences consumers’ purchasing decisions, and what the determinants are 
for the occurrence of DC-SIP. 
 
Table 1. The structure of the analyses 
 Objective 1 
(Producer side) 
Objective 2 
(Consumer side) 
Objective 3 
(Horizontal analyses) 
Aim 
Incentives for brand owners to 
use DC-SIP practices 
Impact of DC-SIP on 
consumers’ purchasing 
decisions and welfare 
Determinants of the 
occurrence of DC-SIP across 
Member States 
Approach 
Conceptual analyses based on 
the theoretical and empirical 
knowledge developed in the 
economics and related literature 
 
Market equilibrium model 
Conceptual analyses based 
on the theoretical and 
empirical knowledge 
developed in the economics 
and related literature 
 
Behavioural experiments 
Econometric estimations 
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3 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
The report used conceptual analyses based on the theoretical and empirical knowledge developed in economics and 
related literature, as well as empirical analyses to provide an economic assessment of DC-SIP (Table 2). 
For Objective 1 (producer side), theoretical and empirical knowledge available in the fields of industrial 
organisation, international marketing, international business, and management, was applied to derive a conceptual 
understanding of the market conditions, and the main motivations of firms (brand owners) to offer different versions 
of seemingly identical branded food products in different Member States. Further, numerical simulations using a 
stylised market equilibrium model were conducted, to investigate the possible reactions of brand owners to, and the 
possible market impacts of, three hypothetical regulation options: (i) information disclosure, (ii) ‘product-of-reference’, 
and (iii) ‘one-market, one-quality’.1,2 
For Objective 2 (consumer side), both conceptual and empirical approaches were applied. The objective of the first 
approach was to provide a conceptual understanding of whether, and how, consumers’ purchasing decisions and 
welfare can be expected to be affected by the fact that the same brand owner offers seemingly identical branded 
food products with different composition to different country-markets. This approach used theoretical and empirical 
knowledge available in the fields of demand theory, behavioural economics, marketing, and consumer psychology.3 
Additionally, for Objective 2, empirical analysis on the impact of DC-SIP on consumers’ choices was conducted.4 For 
this purpose, two types of behavioural experiments were conducted: a discrete choice experiment (DCE) (referred to as 
"online experiment"), and a sensory testing experiment (referred to as "lab experiment"). Discrete choice experiments 
are a standard tool applied in economics to value products (Carson et al., 1994; Batsell and Louviere, 1991). These 
experiments allowed for an investigation of consumers’ preferences for different products, splitting the total value 
among different attributes of a given product, which allowed for valuing different versions of the same branded 
product. This methodology allowed to study how consumers valued the selected sets of product attributes, by asking 
them to state which product version they would choose among different alternatives. The main advantage of the 
online experiment was that it could include multiple product attributes and treatments, and could be tested on a larger 
number of respondents. The lab experiment aimed to obtain consumers’ valuation of the tested products through face-
to-face experiments, where participants directly tasted the different versions of the products. The main advantage of 
the lab experiment was that it could account for consumers’ experienced valuation of the tested food products. 
Moreover, in the lab experiment, the consumers’ choices were consequential (i.e., participants had to purchase the 
product that they choose), and so participants’ responses were less hypothetical (Roe and Just, 2009; Colen et al., 
2016). 
The experiments were conducted for six branded food products, in six Member States (Table 2). The selection of 
Member States was made to ensure a wide geographical distribution, as well as a good representation of different 
socio-economic conditions across all EU Member States. The countries included in the experiments were Germany, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Spain, and Sweden. The selection of the six food products was made based on results 
from the JRC 2018/2019 JRC EU-wide testing campaign (European Commission, 2019), in combination with results 
from a market survey, and focus groups held in each of the six Member States. The market survey helped to identify 
the most commonly purchased food categories and brands, while the focus groups contributed to refining the 
selection of branded food products, by providing insights on consumers’ awareness, expectations, perceptions, and 
experiences of the DC-SIP issue. The JRC 2018/2019 EU-wide testing campaign’s (European Commission 2019) results 
were used to identify products where DC-SIP were present, and to obtain the product composition across the selected 
countries. The final list of selected products included: flavoured yogurt, a pre-cooked pasta dish, chocolate cookies, an 
orange soft drink, crisps, and fish fingers. 
The experimental design of both online and lab experiments included two treatments: 
● Treatment 1: Product presented only with the list of ingredients and nutritional facts panel. 
                                           
1 Information disclosure regulation considers provision of (complete) information to consumers on DC-SIP (e.g., labelling, mandatory information on websites, 
advertising, or any other form of communication). Product-of-reference regulation obliges firms to sell a reference product version in all markets. One-
market, one-quality regulation requires firms to sell a product of the same quality in all markets, whatever the quality level. 
2 For more details see Russo, Menapace, and Sansone (2020). 
3 For more details see Colen et al. (2020). 
4 For more details see Di Marcantonio et al. (2020). 
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● Treatment 2: The same information as in Treatment 1, as well as information indicating for which country each 
tested version would be sold in, in the form of a “made for” claim.5 
The first treatment was used to evaluate the impact of DC-SIP on consumers’ preferences under current 
circumstances, whilst the second treatment revealed how consumers would react if the existence of DC-SIP was made 
more salient. For this purpose, “made for” claims (country of destination) were revealed to respondents to test how 
this affected their preferences. Under Treatment 1, if respondents were indifferent between different product versions, 
this would imply that the DC-SIP practice does not affect their preferences and purchasing decisions. However, if 
respondents show a preference for particular product version(s) over other product version(s), this would imply that 
DC-SIP could affect their purchasing decisions. Under Treatment 2, results would indicate whether the availability of 
explicit information about the country of destination for each version (a proxy for making DC-SIP salient) impacted 
consumers’ preferences for different versions.  
The online experiment was carried out across the six Member States, with a total of 1,500 respondents in each 
Member State. Out of the six selected products, three products were tested in each country (Table 3). The design of the 
online experiment considered three attributes per product (i.e., price, nutritional information, and brand). These 
attributes were combined in different choice cards which included three product versions (one version representing the 
product available in the domestic market, and two taken from foreign countries), and a no-buy option (i.e., the 
possibility for a consumer not to choose any of the proposed versions). The order of the choice cards, the order of the 
product profiles within a choice card, and the order of products were randomised across respondents. Each respondent 
made 18 choices, six choices for each of the three products. 
For the lab experiments, four products and four Member States were selected from the list of branded products and 
Member States which were used in the online experiment,6 with two pairs of products being tested in two pairs of 
countries. Participants tested three different countries’ versions of each product (Table 3). The lab experiment included 
400 participants from each of the four Member States. Participants were paid a fixed amount for participating, which 
they could either keep for themselves, or use to buy the chosen products, in order to avoid hypothetical bias. As such, 
consumers were asked to make a purchase choice for all of the products presented, and a randomly selected ex-post 
choice was binding, implying that consumers had to realise the choice made when buying the selected product.  
Overall, in the lab experiment, each participant tasted three versions of two different products (six tasting experiences 
in total for each participant). The main steps in the sequence of the lab experiment were as follows:  
● Step 1: Participants tasted three different versions of a product without any information (i.e., “blind tasting”), 
rated them (on a scale from 1 to 10), and ranked them from the most preferred to the least preferred; 
● Step 2: Participants received information on the prices, ingredients, and nutritional content of the three 
different versions, and depending on the treatment, information on which country each version was “made 
for”; 
● Step 3: Participants selected the version that they wished to purchase. 
For each participant, two rounds were conducted, with each round comprising of the above three steps. In the Round 2, 
all participants received the “made for” claim in Step 2, and those having it received in Round 1 received information 
on the brand in addition7. 
For Objective 3 (horizontal analysis), the methodology consisted of an econometric analysis using a probit 
estimator, to empirically identify which demand and production-related factors determined the presence of DC-SIP 
across Member States in the European Union. The estimations were based on the data available from the JRC 
2018/2019 EU-wide testing campaign (European Commission, 2019), in combination with demand factors and 
production-related factors collected from different statistical sources (e.g., Eurostat, Eurobarometer, World Bank, and 
Global Dietary Database), to reflect the findings from the theoretical analyses undertaken for Objectives 1 and 2. In 
total, the data set contained information on 127 branded food products from 19 Member States,8 resulting in 7,848 
                                           
5 In the lab experiment also the explanation of DC-SIP itself was provided to respondents additionally to revealing the “made for” claim. 
6 Romania, which is one of the Member States included in the lab experiment, had to be dropped from the sample due to the problems encountered during the 
execution of the lab experiment. 
7 The remaining information (prices, ingredients, nutritional content) was received by all participants in round 2. 
8 One product (pineapple slices) was dropped from the samples because the versions available in different MS were considered to be different products. 
 10 
 
product-Member State pair observations9. The following consumer demand factors were considered: difference in GDP 
per capita, food group price level, dietary index, and attitude index between Member States. The following production-
related factors were considered: distance between Member States, company size (multinational company), product 
complexity (number of ingredients), shared official language, difference in front packaging between different versions, 
and shared border. Additionally, specific characteristics of different product categories, and country-specific factors, 
were controlled for in the estimation in order to account for potential structural factors/characteristics (e.g., type of 
ingredients, sourcing options, type of technology), for different branded products belonging to the same category, and 
to capture potential Member State-specific factors (such as differences in competition environments, technologies, 
national regulations, and institutions).10 
 
Table 2. Methodological approach 
 Objective 1  
(Producer side) 
Objective 2  
(Consumer side) 
Objective 2  
(Horizontal analyses) 
Aim 
Incentives of brand owners 
to use DC-SIP practices 
Impact of DC-SIP on 
consumers’ purchasing 
decisions and welfare 
Consumers’ preferences 
of different versions of 
seemingly identical, 
branded food products 
Determinants of the 
occurrence of DC-SIP across 
Member States 
Approach 
Application of theoretical 
and empirical knowledge 
developed in the fields of 
industrial organisation, 
international marketing, 
international business, and 
management 
 
Market equilibrium model 
(numerical simulations) 
Application of theoretical 
and empirical knowledge 
developed in the fields of 
demand theory, 
behavioural economics, 
marketing, and consumer 
psychology 
Behavioural experiments:  
(1) discrete choice 
experiment (DCE) (online 
experiment) and  
(2) sensory testing 
experiment (lab 
experiment) 
Econometric estimates 
(probit estimator) 
 
Use of results from the JRC 
2018/2019 EU-wide testing 
campaign, in combination 
with demand factors and 
production related factors 
collected from different 
statistical sources (e.g., 
Eurostat, Eurobarometer, 
World Bank, Global Dietary 
Database) 
Type of 
analyses 
Conceptual Conceptual Empirical Empirical 
Product 
coverage 
No specific products No specific products 
Six branded food 
products: flavoured 
yogurt, pre-cooked pasta 
dish, chocolate cookies, 
orange soft drink, crisps, 
fish fingers 
127 branded food products 
Member State 
coverage 
No specific Member States 
No specific Member 
States 
Germany, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Spain, 
Romania, Sweden 
19 Member States 
 
                                           
9 Each observation represents the comparison of a product between two Member States (e.g., flavoured yogurt compared in Germany and Italy). 
10 For more details see Nes, Ciaian, and Di Marcantonio (2020). 
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Table 3. Products tested in each country for the lab and online experiments 
 Countries Products Versions 
Online experiment 
Germany 
Hungary 
Lithuania 
Flavoured yogurt 
Pre-cooked pasta dish 
Chocolate cookies 
Germany 
Hungary 
Lithuania 
Spain 
Romania 
Sweden 
Orange soft drink 
Crisps 
Fish fingers 
Spain 
Romania 
Sweden 
Lab experiment 
Germany 
Hungary 
Flavoured yogurt 
Chocolate cookies 
Germany 
Hungary 
Lithuania 
Spain 
Romania* 
Orange soft drink 
Crisps 
Spain 
Romania 
Sweden 
Notes: * Romania had to be removed from the sample due to problems encountered during the execution of the lab experiment. 
  
 12 
 
4 INCENTIVES OF BRAND OWNERS FOR USING DC-SIP PRACTICES11 
A first step in understanding the incentives driving firms to offer seemingly identical products with a different 
composition, to different groups of consumers, was to explain the factors motivating firms to embark on product 
differentiation (e.g., composition). Product differentiation of firms is the main topic of an extensive literature in the 
field of Industrial Organisation. The standard assumption is that firms behave rationally when they make decisions on 
the quality (including composition) of the products that they supply. They will have incentives to supply the product 
version which maximises profits (e.g., Tirole, 1988; Eaton and Lipsey, 1989; Pepall et al., 2014; Waldman and Jensen, 
2016).  
Thus, the product quality choice is the result of the profit maximisation problem for firms (Box 1). Rational firms 
choose the product composition which maximises their profits, under a set of constraints and market conditions, 
including consumer demand factors, production factors (cost structure), competition, and regulations and institutions. 
Product differentiation is more likely to occur when these factors are heterogeneous between different groups of 
consumers or markets. 
● Demand factors refer to variations of consumers’ preferences regarding food product composition and 
quality across the Single Market. If preferences are spatially heterogeneous, firms might have an incentive to 
supply products with different compositions to consumer in different national markets (Lancaster, 1966; 
Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Saitone and Sexton, 2010; Giannakas, 2011; Merél and Sexton, 2011).  
● Production factors include factors which affect the firms’ production costs related to product quality 
provision (and consequently of composition), including particularly the cost structure of production (e.g., 
economy of scale and the nature of research and development costs, set-up costs, and advertising costs), the 
cost of providing quality (e.g., differences in the costs of providing quality or sourcing of ingredients between 
markets), and technological factors (e.g., cost of transportation, cost of product preservation, local weather 
conditions). In the presence of diseconomies of scale, higher variable costs of quality, higher transportation/ 
preservation costs, the incentive to supply goods of different composition increases. Firms may have an 
incentive to supply goods with different compositions, even when consumers’ preferences are homogeneous, 
if production costs differ across countries (Eaton and Lipsey, 1989; Motta, 1993; Melewar and Vemmervik, 
2004; Brécard, 2010). 
● The nature of competition affects the equilibrium level of product differentiation across differentiated 
markets. The composition of products might reflect the different competition environment, as firms might 
decide to adjust the composition of the products, depending on the strengths of competitors. Consequently, if 
the degree of rivalry differs across markets, differences in composition may emerge, even if consumer 
preferences and production costs are homogeneous (Motta, 1993; Bonanno et al., 2018). 
● Regulations and institutions refer to the rules of game (e.g., food quality and safety standards, and 
private standards) which firms need to comply with if they want to operate in a given market. Differences in 
regulations and institutions between markets may influence production and composition choice, and thus 
may lead to product differentiation.  
These factors explain why firms might decide to provide products with different compositions to different groups of 
consumers across the Single Market. If these factors vary, there is an incentive to adjust the composition of the 
products. As a consequence, different product versions of a product can be found in different areas. In general, 
economic theory concludes that such differentiation is socially efficient under perfect information, and if local 
conditions differ across both consumer groups and Member States. As a consequence, a degree of spatial 
differentiation of products is efficient, as it reflects differences in consumer taste, production factors, market 
structure, and even safety and quality regulations. 
                                           
11 For more details see Russo, Menapace, and Sansone (2020). 
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Box 1. The meaning of “quality” in economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Market separation and discrimination as possible sources of DC-SIP 
Product differentiation does not usually imply DC-SIP. As explained above, product differentiation is contingent on the 
spatial heterogeneity of factors, including demand factors, production factors, competition, and regulations and 
institutions, but does not necessarily imply DC-SIP, in the sense that different product versions are marketed similarly 
or identically (with same or similar packaging) in different markets while they have different composition. A key driver 
for DC-SIP to emerge is market separation which allows firms to engage in third-degree quality discrimination.12 That 
is, DC-SIP can be rationalised as an optimal differential treatment of consumers by firms in separated national 
markets based on the demand conditions. 
The third-degree quality discrimination13 refers to firms’ ability to discriminate between different market segments or 
groups of consumers, that is, selling different versions of the same product to different groups of consumers. In the 
case of DC-SIP, this refers to composition discrimination between consumers in different national markets. The quality 
discrimination is only possible in the absence of (or restricted) arbitrage14 or parallel trade between markets. For 
example, third-degree price discrimination between international markets occurs when it is not possible to buy the 
good at a low price in one country and resell it at a higher price in another country. In other words, firms can only 
engage in discrimination across borders when it is possible to keep the national markets separate, which could arise 
when arbitrage or parallel trade between markets is impeded for legal, institutional, or strategic reasons - e.g., 
exclusive territories, and territorial supply constraints. In contrast, without separated markets, when parallel trade 
between countries is possible, firms are not able to engage in third-degree price discrimination across national 
borders. The possibility of arbitrage would imply that the different versions are made available in markets other than 
that intended by the manufacturer of the product, and that different versions of the same product would coexist on 
the same markets. 
Consequently, when markets are separate, a profit-maximising firm with market power will have incentives to exploit 
such market segmentation opportunities, to extract profits from consumers. With separated markets, a profit-
maximising firm with market power can set market-specific values for each of the decision variables under its control 
(e.g., composition, price). In the context of DC-SIP, a firm can offer different product composition across different 
markets. In other words, separated markets are a pre-condition for firms to be able to offer country-specific product 
versions (as in the case of DC-SIP), which are selectively available only in the countries for which they are intended. If 
                                           
12 Other forms of discrimination are first- and second-degree quality discrimination. The first-degree discrimination, or perfect quality discrimination, occurs when 
firms differentiate product composition for each unit sold, while the second-degree discrimination occurs when firms differentiate product for different 
quantities sold. The first- and second-degree quality discrimination appear not to be relevant for DC-SIP because both imply that consumers have access to 
more than one version of the product of the same brand in a given market (Member State), whereas in the case of DC-SIP only one version is offered in each 
market. For example, a firm engages in second-degree discrimination when it is not able to engage in third-degree discrimination, essentially because the 
firm cannot distinguish which consumers belong to which group/segment. In this case, firms provide more than one quality (version) and rely on consumers 
to (self-) select their preferred quality from those available based on their preferences. In that case, different versions would necessarily be marketed 
distinctively, for the consumer to be able to distinguish and select his/her preferred version.  
13 This is analogous to the more commonly known third-degree price discrimination when firms charge different prices to different groups of consumers for the 
same product. 
14 Arbitrage refers to the practice of taking advantage from a price difference between two or more markets; that is, buying a good at a low price in one market 
and selling it in another market at a higher price. 
In the economic literature (especially in the Industrial Organisation literature), the word “quality” is used in many different 
contexts to refer to any type of product differentiation. It refers to the nature and intensity of product attributes or 
characteristics (Lancaster 1966). Products serving the same purpose, but with different attributes or characteristics are “of 
different quality”. It must be noted that the term may refer to a vertical idea of “quality level” (e.g., high quality versus low 
quality products), and a horizontal notion of “different variety” (such as different flavour or colour) alike. In this sense, it 
includes the case of differences in composition of seemingly identical branded (food) products (DC-SIP). An important 
distinction is the attributes’ classification in search, experience, and credence. This classification is based on the ability of 
consumers to learn about the “quality” of a product before purchase (search quality), after purchase (experience quality), or 
not at all (credence quality). DC-SIP concerns differences in experience or credence attributes. 
 14 
 
markets are not separated, the likelihood that more than one product version is available in any given market 
increases (provided that consumers in that market have heterogeneous preferences).15 
Overall, the implications for DC-SIP can be summarised along the following three possible cases (Paroush, 1978; 
Paroush and Peles, 1981; Valletti and Szymanski, 2006; Kyle, 2011): 
● If markets are separated, country-specific versions of a given product may possibly emerge. The 
occurrence of DC-SIP practice is possible if barriers between national markets within the Single Market exist. 
● If markets are not separated, country-specific product versions are likely to be available in countries other 
than that for which they are originally intended. This means that different versions of a given product would 
co-exist in a given national market. It might then be profitable for a firm to either remove differences (so 
that ultimately only one product version is available), or label the different versions (e.g., to use 
labels/branding, to allow the consumer to distinguish the different versions). The use of distinctive 
labels/brands is to be expected in order for the firm to avoid any negative effects of consumers’ uncertainty 
regarding product quality.16 It follows that the DC-SIP practice is less likely to occur when markets are not 
separated (i.e., when the EU market is indeed a Single Market) and information on product quality (including 
composition) is readily available or easy to acquire. DC-SIP could still emerge when preferences between 
different markets are significantly different, and preference overlap is very modest. Likewise, DC-SIP could 
still emerge when arbitrage across countries is difficult (e.g., high transportation cost, and low price-quality 
differential between countries).   
● A theoretical possibility is that when markets are not separated, composition differences (in the 
form of “national” product versions) could be introduced by firms to re-establish the ability of 
the firm to price discriminate internationally. That is, the introduction of national versions helps a firm 
creating some sort of barriers between countries. This would be the case if a firm manages to separate 
markets by introducing market-specific versions. A possible example of how introducing versions might 
contribute to create trade barriers between countries is the use of a limited set of languages on the package, 
restricting distribution of that version to a specific set of countries. Another possible explanation is that 
retailers might be reluctant to place “similar” (although not identical) products from the same manufacturer 
(or with the same brand) on their shelves, to avoid consumer dissatisfaction due to composition differences. 
However, it must be noted that this third case is only a theoretical possibility, as such a case was not 
explored in the literature, and it is unclear whether it is empirically meaningful. 
 
Box 2. Parallel trade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
15 It is in principle possible that preferences are such that only one version is demanded in each market. Nevertheless, this case seems not to be empirically 
relevant as the only explanation for DC-SIP.  
16 If the product features distinguishing the different versions are search attributes that are easily observable prior to consumption (e.g., size, colour), they do not 
require branding, labelling, or certification, as consumers can establish the features of the product before purchase.  
Parallel trade is a form of arbitrage which undermines the ability of a firm to engage in third-degree price discrimination. 
There are different doctrines concerning parallel trade. In the USA, the prevailing doctrine is the “first sale” doctrine. This 
means that once a product is sold, the original owner of the property who had rights over the product loses his/her rights 
to determine how the product is subsequently sold or distributed. The effect of this doctrine is to prevent price 
discrimination against consumers in the jurisdiction that applies this doctrine. The European Union has a regime called 
“community exhaustion”. This means that once products have been sold in any Member State, the intellectual property 
right holder has lost the right to control/restrict any further movement of the products within the European Union. 
Nevertheless, this doctrine allows the original property holder to prevent products sold at low prices outside the European 
Union from re-entering into the European markets. The reason for this regime is to promote the integration of the 
European Union market. 
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4.2 Marketing mix strategies to place products in different markets as possible sources of DC-
SIP 
A different strand of studies linked to international marketing, and international business literature suggest that DC-
SIP could arise due to a mix of strategies which firms use to place products in different markets. The ‘marketing mix’ 
strategies pursued by international firms across national borders could include either adaptation and localisation of 
products (‘go international’), or standardisation of products (‘go global’) (Schmid and Kotulla, 2011; Jeong et al., 2018; 
Ohmae, 1989; Taylor, 1991; Levitt, 1983; Vignali, 2001; Vrontis et al., 2009; Son et al., 2018).  
The main benefits of the adaptation and localisation strategy (‘go international’) are due to factors such as 
cultural/religious differences, differences in taste and preferences, the existence of country-specific laws and customs, 
heterogeneity in the ecological and competition environments, and heterogeneity in economic situation (e.g., 
consumers’ willingness to pay). In turn, the main benefits of the standardisation (‘go global’) strategy are due to 
factors such as economies of scale and cost reduction, improved resources allocation, cultural convergence and 
technology development, increase of border-crossing and tourist activities, harmonisation of internal production, and 
quality control and global brand reputation.  
A third (hybrid) strategy is possible where firms employ a mix of both strategies in order to benefit from local product 
adaptation (‘go international’), and global brand reputation (‘go global’), as both have positive relationships with 
performance. This hybrid strategy might imply DC-SIP because companies offer global brands tailored to local 
conditions (Figure 1). According to Schmid and Kotulla (2011), the optimal degree of product 
standardisation/adaptation to achieve performance depends on “four situational fits”: (i) cross-national homogeneity 
of demand, (ii) potential for cross-national economies of scale, (iii) cost of modification of the product, and (iv) foreign 
price elasticity of demand. These four situations affect the relationship between standardisation/adaptation and 
foreign product profit. The implications for DC-SIP are such that they are more likely to occur when cross-national 
heterogeneity of demand is high, potential for cross-national economies of scale are limited, the costs of changing the 
composition of the product are low, and the elasticity of demand in the foreign market is low (because a potential 
price increase, generated by increased costs of adapting the product for the foreign market, would have a small effect 
on quantity demanded when the demand elasticity is low). 
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Figure 1. Marketing mix strategies pursued by international firms to place products in different markets 
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differences among the product versions that are sold under the same brand and packaging (i.e., in the 
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an informed purchasing decision. This means that the DC-SIP practice reduces social welfare, and may have 
unexpected redistribution effects across firms and across consumers. It might be possible that certain groups 
of consumers benefit from DC-SIP strategies. Similarly, it might be possible that local firms may enjoy higher 
profits if the international firm engages in a DC-SIP strategy (e.g., when tailoring versions to local demand 
conditions). 
● Information disclosure regulations perform better than mandatory quality regulations (i.e., ‘product-of-
reference’, and ‘one-market, one-quality’ policies) to address DC-SIP. Information disclosure regulations still 
allow firms to adopt socially efficient product differentiation if needed (see above). By contrast, mandatory 
quality regulations might prevent firms from adapting products to local demand and conditions, even in those 
cases when consumers might benefit from it. 
● Information disclosure policies—if they are successful in reducing the information asymmetry—are socially 
efficient, but two results of the model must be considered.  
o Firstly, they might have unintended redistribution effects. The change in consumer information is expected to 
trigger adaptation of the marketing mix (see section 4.2) by regulated firms. Competition forces are expected to 
determine adjustments in the marketing mix of other firms as well (see Section 4, bullet point 3). The final outcome 
is a change in the overall market equilibrium. The model supports the theoretical possibility that the emerging 
equilibrium might result in a reduction of surplus of specific consumer groups and/or in profit losses for firms that 
were not engaging in DC-SIP strategies before regulation. 
o Secondly, the policy may be difficult to design and implement in practice, as the information requirements may be 
complex and may differ from consumer to consumer. 
● It is possible that mandatory quality regulations which impose the same product composition (‘product-of-
reference’, and ‘one-market, one-quality’ policies) in all Member States may have unintended consequences 
as well. These policies may result in trade reduction, less competition in the market, harm to consumers, and 
profit loss to firms that were not engaging in DC-SIP strategies before regulation (e.g., local firms). 
● Enforcement of specific quality levels such as the ‘product-of-reference’ and ‘one-market, one-quality’ 
policies could only be socially beneficial if the differences in consumers’ preferences between markets are 
sufficiently small (i.e., if the difference in consumers quality preferences between markets is small), and if 
the information deficiency (i.e., imperfect consumer information about DC-SIP) is relatively large. The 
conditions for avoiding welfare-reducing regulations are stricter for the ‘product-of-reference’ policy than for 
the ‘one-market, one-quality’ policy. 
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5 IMPACT OF DC-SIP ON CONSUMERS 
5.1 What does the literature suggest about the potential impact of DC-SIP on consumers?17 
The literature shows that consumers care about the perceived quality of food products they consume (Grunert, 2005). 
DC-SIP may thus affect consumers’ purchasing decisions and welfare, if perceived quality differs between versions of 
DC-SIP products offered in different Member States. When consumers have a choice between product versions, they 
are expected to choose the version which provides the highest net value (surplus) by comparing perceived quality and 
price across all versions. The process of consumer quality perception formation, and individual consumer preferences, 
play a crucial role. As a result, the impact of DC-SIP is not straightforward, and depends on consumer perception 
formation and preferences, as well as on the price at which products are offered. Presenting consumers with the 
product version typically offered in a different country-market, instead of with the product version they would be 
offered under DC-SIP, can affect purchasing decisions and welfare either positively, negatively or not at all (Figure 2): 
Depending on the formation of quality perception by consumers, certain differences (particularly small ones) between 
DC-SIP product versions may go unnoticed, or may not be valued, and will therefore not affect purchasing decisions or 
consumer welfare. DC-SIP may affect consumer welfare only when consumers perceive and value the quality of the 
own-country (domestic) product version and product version offered in other countries differently.  
If consumers perceive the domestic version to be of higher quality than the version offered in other countries, DC-SIP 
can have negative, positive, or no impact on consumers: 
● When companies succeed in adapting product versions to the specific preferences in each country, then on 
average the own-country product version will be valued more highly than (and preferred to) other-country 
versions. As long as the prices do not offset the differences in consumer valuation between versions, 
consumers would likely prefer and purchase product version offered in their own country. In this case the 
existence of DC-SIP increases consumer welfare. 
● If the price difference exactly offsets the difference in consumer valuation between domestic and non-
domestic versions, consumers would not be affected by DC-SIP because they would be indifferent between 
different versions: the consumer surplus derived from the own-country version would be the same as the 
surplus obtained from the other-country product version. 
● However, if the price difference more than offsets the difference in consumer valuation between the own-
country and other-country version, consumers would be affected negatively by DC-SIP because the consumer 
surplus derived from the own-country version (even though consumers value it more highly) would be lower 
than it would be if they were offered the alternative product version with its corresponding lower price. This 
would occur in situations when the price of the other-country version is significantly smaller than the price of 
the own-country version, so that it would not pay for consumers to purchase the higher valued own-country 
version if they had the option to choose. 
If companies offer different product versions and consumers perceive the version offered in their own country as of 
lower value, again DC-SIP can have negative, positive, or no impact on consumers, depending on the price at which 
different versions are offered: 
● If the alternative product version offered in other countries can only be offered at a relatively high price, such 
that that the price difference more than offsets the difference in consumers’ valuation between versions, 
consumers would choose their own country version, and thus the DC-SIP practice is welfare-enhancing. In this 
case, the other-country version would be perceived as too expensive for consumers even though it is valued 
higher. 
● If instead the price of the other-country version is such that the price difference exactly offsets the consumer 
valuation difference between versions, then consumers would not be affected by DC-SIP because they would 
be indifferent between versions.  
                                           
17 For more details see Colen et al. (2020). 
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● However, when the price of the alternative product version is lower, equal or not sufficiently higher as 
compared to the price of the own-country version, such that the price difference does not offset the 
additional valuation of the other-country version, then the consumer surplus derived from the own-country 
version would be lower than if they were offered the alternative product version. In this setting, the DC-SIP 
practice has a negative impact on consumer welfare and purchasing decisions. 
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Figure 2. Expected impact of DC-SIP on consumers’ purchasing choices and welfare 
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Formation of consumers’ quality perceptions 
The assessment of the impact of DC-SIP on consumers’ purchasing choices and welfare shown in Figure 2 is thus 
dependent on consumers' perception of product versions as different. That is, it depends on consumers’ quality 
valuation of the different product versions. The formation of quality perception by consumers is a complex and often 
subjective process. Consumers use a variety of signals or cues to infer the quality of food products, which ultimately 
determines their purchase behaviour (Cox, 1962; Olson and Jacoby, 1972).  
When consumers evaluate the quality of a product (i.e., when they form their quality perception of a product), they use 
(an array of) available signals or cues relating to a product to generate a perception relating to each of the factors 
that are relevant in their decision-making, and to make a judgement of the product (Cox, 1962). The manner in which 
consumers derive a quality perception based on signals and cues is relevant to understanding the potential impact of 
DC-SIP on consumers (Box 1). 
The process of food quality perception formation has vertical and horizontal dimensions (Grunert, 2005). The vertical 
dimension of food quality perception refers to the use of intrinsic or extrinsic cues to infer the food quality of a 
product. Intrinsic cues refer to the physical properties of the product, such as ingredients, which cannot be changed 
without also altering the physical properties of the product. Extrinsic cues refer to everything else, such as price, brand 
name, packaging, store image, and advertising, which is not part of the physical product (Olson and Jacoby, 1972). The 
extent to which cues are used to infer product quality vary by product and by consumer (Cox, 1962; Steenkamp, 1990). 
Consumers use only those cues that (i) they believe to be predictive of the quality they want to evaluate; and (ii) they 
feel confident in using (Cox, 1962; Olson and Jacoby, 1972). 
The horizontal dimension of food quality perception refers to consumers' adjustment of quality perceptions over time 
(before and after purchase). Before purchase, consumers’ quality assessment is based on observable intrinsic and 
extrinsic cues. After purchase, their quality perception might be confirmed or disconfirmed when unobservable cues are 
revealed, or after the product is experienced (tasted), which will determine repurchasing decisions. Credence qualities 
(e.g., health or organic production processes, the occurrence of DC-SIP, or other characteristics which cannot be 
observed or experienced by consumers even after consumption of the product) might be revealed by information 
provided at any stage of the purchasing choice process and may confirm or disconfirm quality perceptions, and will 
determine consumer satisfaction and consumers’ repurchasing decisions (Oliver, 1980). 
The definition of DC-SIP essentially refers to product versions that are different in their intrinsic characteristics, while 
their extrinsic characteristics (particularly brand) are the same, or largely the same. The literature shows that 
consumers’ product quality perceptions are often based on extrinsic quality cues (e.g., brand, place of origin, 
packaging) (Webb and Po, 2000; Erdem and Swait, 1998, Aaker, 1991, Verlegh and Steenkamp, 1999; Silayoi and 
Speece, 2004), which may result in any intrinsic differences in composition between product versions going unnoticed. 
That is, when the predictive value of intrinsic cues is low, when consumers do not have confidence in intrinsic cues or 
in their own ability to interpret them, or when intrinsic cues are difficult to assess because of time constraints, 
extrinsic cues become more important in the quality judgement process and will lead consumers’ purchasing decisions 
(Olson and Jacoby, 1972). The more quality perception is based on specific extrinsic quality cues, the less likely it is 
that DC-SIP will be noticed, and the less likely it is that consumers’ purchasing decision and welfare will be affected by 
compositional differences between branded products. 
Moreover, consumers are confronted with a large amount of information and limited time when making purchasing 
decisions. As a result, consumers mostly rely on just a few key cues that are easy to assess, from which they form a 
perception of the overall quality of the product (Selnes, 1993). In that sense, visual cues such as brands and packaging 
(i.e., front-of-pack information) may play a stronger role than, for example, information provided on the back-of-
pack—even though the latter likely provide more and more accurate information on the ingredients or actual 
composition of the product.  
The differences between DC-SIP versions are probably noticed by consumers (and affect their purchasing decisions) 
only in situations when the intrinsic differences are significant, are important cues for signalling quality, and/or are 
relatively easily detectable. 
Even if differences in intrinsic characteristics are noted upon comparing the two product versions, the likelihood of DC-
SIP being detected might be low in many cases, because it is not possible to compare a product version from a 
different place. Only people travelling often or living close to a border may be able to detect DC-SIP. 
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When DC-SIP are noticed or people are able to taste/experience the difference, the impact on consumers’ decisions can 
be expected to be highly heterogeneous. The multitude of combinations and contexts described above—regarding both 
intrinsic and extrinsic food product cues, the consumer relationships with brands in dissimilar product categories, the 
time-constrained setting in which consumers tend to make purchasing decisions, the varying consumer relationships to 
different countries of origin or globality cues, and the information deficiency regarding product versions available in 
other country markets—predict a very substantial heterogeneity in consumers' product quality assessment. This 
heterogeneity is expected to lead to diversity in consumers' quality perceptions and preferences for the different 
quality dimensions, between products, shopping contexts or countries. Individual consumers themselves may also act 
in different ways as time passes (Baltas and Doyle, 2001). As a result, whether or not consumers perceive two product 
versions as different, whether differences are considered significant, and which of the preferences is stronger, is 
expected to be heterogeneous between countries, between consumers within the same country, between products, and 
may even depend on the context and situation in which a consumer finds themselves at a particular point in time. 
 
Consumers’ perception of deception and unfairness and the implication of DC-SIP for their food choices 
Aside from the question of whether different product versions are perceived and valued differently, the existence of 
DC-SIP itself may generate consumer reactions.  
In most situations, it is likely the case that consumers expect that the branded product they buy in one Member State 
is the same as the one they would buy in another Member State. Most consumers do not have the chance to verify 
whether this is true, so it can be considered a credence attribute of the product. That means that, unless information 
about different versions being offered in different Member States is explicitly and clearly communicated to consumers, 
the existence of different versions is neither suspected nor detected, and purchasing decisions will not be affected. 
An exception are populations living close to borders, living in two countries or travelling frequently, who might 
therefore do some shopping abroad. The greater the geographical proximity, and the more frequent between-countries 
consumer travel, the more likely it is that some consumers will be exposed to what happens in the other country’s 
market. By actually comparing the details on the back of product packaging, or by experiencing similar or identically 
branded and packaged products offered in different Member States, those consumers themselves may find 
differences in lists of ingredients, nutritional compositions, taste or texture, etc. Yet, for the larger part of consumers, 
the existence of different versions is likely neither suspected, nor detected. 
Consumers might be exposed to the DC-SIP issue by various means, such as by communication with other consumers, 
a third party, or via public media. Once people become exposed to the fact that different country-markets receive 
different product versions, this might result in consumer dissatisfaction and generate a consumer reaction (Oliver, 
1980). Strong cultural differences between countries, trust and beliefs, and expectations (what practices to expect 
from industry) are relevant here, and will guide the direction and strength of reaction, which might differ between and 
within countries. 
The dissatisfaction resulting from consumers' exposure to DC-SIP might derive from two potential sources: 
● Perceived deception: Awareness of DC-SIP may disconfirm consumers' expectations associated with particular 
brands (e.g., their belief that they are identical across countries, their feeling of belonging to a larger 
community, their belief that the branded product guarantees a minimum or high level of quality, status 
associated with brands). This disconfirmation of expectations may lead consumers to feel deceived or misled. 
● Perceived unfairness: The fact that product versions are not equal across countries may generate a feeling of 
unfair treatment. The extent of unfairness perceptions depends on the reasons and motivations for DC-SIP. 
Unfairness perception occurs particularly when consumers perceive that they are treated unequally compared 
to other consumers (consumers in other countries) (Xia et al., 2004) or perceive DC-SIP as illegitimate, 
deceptive, unethical (Smith et al., 2010) or generating disproportionate profits to brand owners (Kahneman et 
al., 1986).  
Perceptions of deception or unfairness with respect to DC-SIP are asymmetric: consumers are expected to have a 
stronger perception of deception and unfairness in markets receiving the lower quality versions, as compared to 
markets receiving the higher quality versions (Colen et al., 2020). In markets where the higher-quality version is 
offered, consumers are likely to consider the DC-SIP issue less important. 
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Both deception and unfairness perceptions might affect consumers’ satisfaction in a product, may generate 
consumers’ responses, and affect their (re)purchase behaviour. Consumers’ reaction to DC-SIP will ultimately depend 
on how strongly they believe that product versions vary, and on the magnitude of the perceived unfairness and the 
disconfirmation of expected brand value (Laufer et al., 2005; Sengupta et al., 2015).  
● For consumers with low perceived unfairness and disconfirmation of expectations, their reaction to DC-SIP is 
likely to be insignificant or could be short-lived. 
● If the perceived unfairness is strong or disconfirmation of expectations is sizable, it might generate 
consumers’ reactions such as reconsideration of purchasing decisions, reduced purchasing intentions, switch 
to other brands, reduction of the company’s brand trust and image, and breakdown of consumers’ trust in the 
uniformity or status they associated with global brands. 
● Depending on how strongly consumers' feel about DC-SIP, consumers’ responses may be only a short-term 
reaction, after which consumers may revert back to their habitual purchase pattern, while if consumers care 
strongly about DC-SIP, this effect may last longer.  
● However, even in the presence of high perceived unfairness and the disconfirmation of expectations, 
consumers may not necessarily respond by changing their purchasing behaviours, for various reasons. The 
negative experience may play only a limited role in their motivations for product choice, no better alternative 
products may be available, they might be budget-constrained, or due to various habits or cultural factors. 
● On the other hand, consumers’ non-response to DC-SIP by not changing their purchase behaviours might still 
lead to a reduction in consumer welfare due to feelings of unfairness or dissatisfaction with brand value if 
the version offered in the own country-market is perceived to be of lower value. 
These analyses of the potential impact of DC-SIP on consumers’ purchasing decisions and welfare are based on the 
existing conceptual and empirical literature in the fields of demand theory, behavioural economics, marketing and 
consumer psychology, and other related areas. The existing literature does not provide a specific assessment of DC-
SIP. As a result, this analysis did not quantify the exact impact of DC-SIP, but provides understanding of the potential 
impacts DC-SIP might have on consumers. The magnitude of DC-SIP’s effect on consumers is an empirical question, 
which is analysed next. 
5.2 Empirical evidence of the potential impact of DC-SIP on consumers18 
While the above analysis provides a general, conceptual understanding of the potential impacts of DC-SIP on 
consumer choices and welfare, the experiments conducted bring empirical evidence to bear on this issue. That is, the 
online and lab experiments conducted (Table 2) attempt to provide answers to the first two questions in Figure 2: 
whether consumers value product versions offered in different Member States differently and, if so, whether they 
value the domestic version above or below the non-domestic one. 
The results of the online experiment (Figure 3) show that for the majority of tested country-product models (23 out of 
30 cases), when there is no information provided on which country each version was made for (i.e., no “made for” 
claim in Treatment 1), the DC-SIP practice has a very limited impact on consumers. This means that consumers are 
indifferent between the domestic version as compared to versions sold in other tested countries. For the few cases 
where the impact of DC-SIP was detected, no systematic geographical or product pattern was spotted in terms of 
consumers’ preference for domestic or non-domestic versions.  
When consumers are made aware about the existence of DC-SIP with the inclusion of the “made for” claim19 (Figure 
3), in a majority of cases they show a preference for one version (the own-country or the other-country version). For 
22 out of the 30 tested country-product combinations, consumers indicate a preference for one or the other version. In 
six cases, there is a preference for the domestic version of the product, in two for the non-domestic version, and in the 
remaining cases there are negative preferences for the domestic (8 cases) and non-domestic (9) versions20. Again, 
there is no clear geographical pattern in the effect of the “made for” claim. Hence, when consumers are made aware 
                                           
18 For more details see Di Marcantonio et al. (2020). 
19 This claim bring to the attention of consumers that the products are different, as they are tailored to different countries.  
20 In two cases, there were negative preferences for both domestic and non-domestic versions, whereas in one case both preference for domestic and negative 
preference for non-domestic were observed.  
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of different product versions with different composition being offered in different countries, they do react. However, 
this is not evidence of the impact of DC-SIP itself on consumers, but of the impact of the “made for” claim. As argued 
above in the conceptual analysis, consumers often use extrinsic signals to infer the quality of food products. The 
“made for” claim is just such an extrinsic signal and the results of the experiments suggest that consumer choices are 
affected when this information is revealed to them. 
 
Figure 3. Results from the online experiment 
  
The lab experiment mostly confirms the findings of the online experiment. The results of the lab experiment show that 
based on tasting, nutritional and ingredient information, participants in the majority of tested country-product 
combinations (4 out of 6 cases) have no preference for one or the other version (Figure 4). Yet, when participants are 
informed about DC-SIP by the ‘made for’ claim and for which country the different versions are made (Figure 4), they 
often do indicate a preference for the domestic version (8 out of 12 cases). However, in 3 out of these 8 cases, one of 
the other country versions was also preferred.21  
 
                                           
21 Note that the total number of tested country-product models were 6 with “made for” claims and 12 without “made for” claims. 
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Figure 4. Results from the lab experiment 
  
 
Combining the findings of the lab and online experiment, the empirical results suggest that: 
● the impact of DC-SIP on consumers’ valuation and purchasing decisions is heterogeneous across the studied 
products and Member States; 
● in both settings (lab and online experiments), without information on which country a product version is 
“made for”, no distinct preference for any of the versions is found for a majority of country-product pairs. 
This suggests that in the absence of explicit information on the occurrence of DC-SIP, the DC-SIP practice has 
insignificant impact on consumers independent of the method used; 
● when consumers are made aware of the existence of DC-SIP via the inclusion of a “made for” claim, there is 
a reversal of this finding in both settings. In 22 out of 30 product-country pairs for the online experiment, 
and for 8 out of 12 for the lab experiment, consumers show a preference for one of the versions. This largely 
confirms that consumers’ preferences and choices are affected if they are made aware of the issue, 
independent of the method used;  
● providing consumers with the “made for” claim, results both in preferences for the domestic and for the 
foreign versions of the products. Therefore, no clear conclusion on the impact on welfare of the “made for” 
claim when consumers are made aware of it can be drawn. 
The experiments analysed DC-SIP’s impact on consumers’ preferences for a selected number of branded products and 
Member States. As a result, the analyses are valid only for the products and Member States included in the 
experiments, and cannot be straightforwardly extrapolated to other products and Member States.  
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6 DETERMINANTS OF THE OCCURRENCE OF DC-SIP BETWEEN MEMBER STATES22 
The previous sections have attempted to provide understanding of the DC-SIP issues from the producer side (i.e., the 
incentives driving firms to offer seemingly identical products which have different compositions) and from the 
consumer side (i.e., the potential impact of DC-SIP on consumer choices and welfare). This section provides empirical 
evidence by considering both demand- and production-related factors, in an attempt to establish which factors explain 
the occurrence of DC-SIP between Member States. More specifically, the econometric estimates that were used to 
derive the results indicate whether a given demand- or production-related factor increases, decreases or does not 
affect the probability that Member States will have different versions of seemingly identical branded food products. 
The key results of the estimates are as follows (Table 4): 
● The difference in GDP per capita is considered to account for potential differences in willingness to pay for 
products between Member States. The estimated results show that a greater difference in income level 
between two Member States increases the probability that the two Member States will have different 
versions of seemingly identical branded food products. If two Member States have identical income levels, 
the probability that the product versions offered in these two countries are different is 39%. As the income 
gap increases, the probability of the occurrence of DC-SIP between the country-pairs increases. For the 
country-pair with the greatest income difference, which is the country-pair Denmark and Bulgaria, the 
predicted probability of a product being different is 52%. 
● Two variables were considered to control for cross-country differences in consumers’ preferences: the dietary 
index and the attitude index. The dietary index aims to derive preferences from current consumption patterns, 
while the attitude index captures consumers’ attitudes towards different product characteristics (e.g., whether 
it is organic, country of origin, respect for local tradition). The dietary index is found to have a positive impact 
on the probability of the occurrence of DC-SIP between Member States, while the attitude index has a 
statistically insignificant impact. That is, in the case of the dietary index, a greater difference in the index 
between Member States increases the probability that firms offer different product versions between 
Member States. 
● Although the difference in food group price level between two Member States has a positive effect on the 
occurrence of DC-SIP, the magnitude of this effect is relatively small. This small magnitude implies that the 
probability of the occurrence of DC-SIP between Member State pairs increases as the price difference 
between Member States increases, but this effect is relatively minor. 
● As the distance between two Member States increases, the probability that product versions are identical 
decreases. This relationship is expected, as products sold in Member States that are further apart are less 
likely to come from the same production plant. As products sold in the EU may originate from various 
production plants, products coming from the same manufacturing plant may be more likely to have a similar 
set of ingredients. 
● If a product is produced by an international company, the probability of the product being different in the 
country-pair increases by around 8%. This could be because larger (multinational) companies can divide the 
fixed cost of product development among several markets, might be in a better position to benefit from 
global brand reputation, or might be in a position to maintain greater product portfolio and to access more 
markets. 
● Similarly, less complex products—products with less than four ingredients—are about 25% less likely to have 
different composition for a given country-pair. This is because companies may have less incentive to create 
different versions of less complex products, given that the degree of freedom to create a new version is 
lower. The more ingredients a product contains, the more options firms have for adapting products to a local 
market. Also, as products may be produced at several production plants located in different countries, 
sourcing an identical bundle of ingredients across various plants may be more challenging for a firm as the 
number of ingredients increases. 
● A shared official language between two Member States tends to reduce the probability of different versions 
being sold in the two Member States. 
                                           
22 For more details see Nes, Ciaian, and Di Marcantonio (2020). 
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● A greater difference in the design of the front-of-pack predicts a greater probability of DC-SIP. Compared to 
a product with an identical front-of-pack, a product with a similar front-of-pack appearance between 
country-pairs is around 22% more likely to be offered in different versions, while products with a different 
front-of-pack are around 37% more likely to be different versions between country-pairs. 
● Specific characteristics of different product categories and country-specific factors are also found to impact 
the presence of DC-SIP between Member States, which suggests that potential structural differences between 
categories of branded products and Member States affect whether versions are different or the same 
between Member States. 
 
Table 4. Determinants of the occurrence of DC-SIP between Member States, derived from 
econometric estimates 
 Effect on probability of 
occurrence of DC-SIP 
between Member States 
Consumer factors  
   Difference in GDP per capita between Member States Increases 
   Difference in food group price level between Member States Increases 
   Difference in diet index between Member States Increases 
   Difference in attitude index between Member States No impact 
  
Production factors  
   Difference in distance between Member States Increases 
   Multinational company Increases 
   Less complex products (products with less than four ingredients) Decreases 
   Shared Official Language between Member States Decreases 
   Difference in front packaging between different versions of the same branded products Increases 
  
Other factors  
Product category and country-specific factors 
Increases or decreases 
depending on the product 
category or Member States 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
The results of the economic analyses of DC-SIP in the Single Market described in this report allow the following 
conclusions to be drawn, relating to the three objectives of the project:  
Incentives of brand owners for using DC-SIP practices (Objective 1): 
● Conceptual analyses suggest that drivers that might motivate firms to offer products with different composition 
in different markets include spatial heterogeneity in demand factors (such as consumer preferences, culture, 
social and demographic characteristics), production factors (such as factor costs, economies/diseconomies of 
scale, fixed versus variable costs of providing different varieties), competition (such as the intensity and the 
nature of rivalry) and regulations/institutions. However, these factors might not necessarily lead to DC-SIP. 
● The existence of separate national markets (e.g., due to territorial supply constraints) is the main precondition for 
DC-SIP to occur. When markets are separate, the rationale for the practice of DC-SIP is expected to be part of a 
firm’s optimal strategy to maximise profits. A firm will adapt (or not adapt) the composition of the product, and 
offer (or not offer) national versions depending on market conditions (supply and demand), and on the ability of a 
firm to exploit differences and the separation of national markets. 
● DC-SIP could arise as a result of a mix of marketing strategies that international firms pursue to place products in 
different markets. These strategies could include adaptation (‘go international’) or standardisation (‘go global’) of 
products across markets. DC-SIP may occur when firms engage in a hybrid strategy encompassing both 
adaptation and standardisation, as both have positive relationships with performance. This hybrid strategy might 
imply DC-SIP because companies offer global brands tailored to local conditions. 
● Numerical simulations using a stylised market equilibrium model suggest that (i) the DC-SIP practice reduces 
social welfare and may have unexpected redistribution effects across firms and across consumers; (ii) policies 
ensuring that consumers have enough information to assess products perfectly (information disclosure) is the 
best option for tackling DC-SIP, as it restores market efficiency and maximises social surplus; (ii) mandatory 
quality regulations which impose the same product composition (‘product-of-reference’, and ‘one-market, one-
quality’ policies) in all Member States appear to be inferior to information disclosure regulations, as they may 
have unintended consequences and are socially efficient only under specific circumstances. 
Impact of DC-SIP on consumers (Objective 2): 
● Conceptual analyses show that perceived quality and preferences determine how consumers value a product. The 
formation of consumers’ perception of DC-SIP is a complex process, as consumers take in consideration different 
intrinsic (e.g., composition) and extrinsic signals (e.g., brand, geographical origin, brand) to infer food quality. 
Moreover, DC-SIP may lead to consumer perception of deception (disconfirmation of expected value of branded 
products) and perception of unfairness (resulting from product versions not being equal across countries). As a 
result, the impact of DC-SIP on consumer choices could be nil or unnoticed, positive or negative, and 
heterogeneous across consumers within a Member State: 
o DC-SIP might be unnoticed or not taken in consideration when making purchasing decisions because consumers 
often use extrinsic signals to infer the quality of products rather intrinsic signals (i.e., composition) 
o Consumers might be more likely to be affected by DC-SIP when differences in composition are significant between 
different versions 
o Price differences between different versions may offset the consumers’ valuation differences between the versions 
and thus may affect consumers’ purchasing decisions. For example, even if composition is significantly different 
between versions and the versions are valued differently by consumers, consumers may still prefer the perceived 
lower quality version if it is significantly cheaper than the perceived higher quality version. 
o The mere occurrence of DC-SIP may affect consumers’ choices and welfare if consumers’ perceptions of deception 
and unfairness are strong. 
● The results of behavioural experiments show that if consumers are not informed about which country each 
version of the product is “made for”, in the majority of cases they are indifferent between versions for tested 
products in selected Member States. There is no evidence of geographical patterns of difference in preferences for 
DC-SIP products. These results indicate that the DC-SIP practice does not impact consumer choices when its 
presence is not made explicit to consumers. 
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● However, when consumers are informed about which country each version of the product is “made for”, in the 
majority of cases they prefer one of the versions. There is a clear preference for domestic or non-domestic 
versions in the online experiment, whereas there is prevalence for domestic versions in the lab experiment. These 
results suggest that it is the provision of information about which country the product version is “made for” and 
thus the awareness about the existence of DC-SIP that generates the preference for one of the versions. 
Determinants of the occurrence of DC-SIP between Member States (Objective 3): 
Econometric estimates show that a greater difference in income level between two Member States increases the 
probability that the two Member States have different versions of seemingly identical branded food products. The 
analyses also show that, although the income difference between two Member States is a driver of DC-SIP, other 
factors—such as heterogeneous consumer preferences across Member States, distance between Member States, 
company size, price level and product complexity—also contribute to a firm’s motivation to offer different versions of 
seemingly identical branded food products in different Member States. Specific characteristics of different product 
categories and country-specific factors are also found to impact the occurrence of DC-SIP between Member States. 
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